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In the

SUPREME COURT.
of the

STATE OF UTAH
niO~TE ~lOSES,

doing business as
Rancho Packing Co.,
Plaintiff, Resp1ondent,
Case No.

vs.

7548

ARCHIE McFARLAND and SONS,
a corporation,
Defendant, Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
WARWICK C. LAMOREAUX
DAVID K. WATKISS
Attorneys for Defendant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. PRELIMIINARY ·STATEMENT
The parties are referred to as in the court below.
Plaintiff brought this action in the District Court ·
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for Salt Lake County; and following a trial before the
Court 'Sitting without a jury, a judgement for the plaintiff was entered in the sum of $2,686.98.
The amended complaint alleged that on or about
the 2-8th day of Oetober, 1947, plaintiff and defendant
entered into a contract by the terms of which the plaintiff agreed to buy and the defendant agreed to sell 30,000
lbs. of boneless mutton at 241f2 cents per pound, and the
defendant agreed to deliver such merchandise at the rate
of 5,000 .pounds per week; that defendant delivered only
I
6,635 ·pounds and refused to deliver the remaining
23,365 lbs., thereby necessitating the plaintiff, in order
to mitigate his damages , to purchase this amount on
the open market which caused him a loS's of $2,686.98.
By way of answer defendant admits selling meat
to the plaintiff, but alleges that it was on an ''open
order" basis, and that such orders were ·subject to
confirmation and aeceptance by the defendant's home
office in Sallt Lake; that the defendant was first appraised of this claimed ''order'' of sale under which
plaintiff ·is suing in January, 1948, and ·at that time
declined to aceept it but promised to shi,p all they
could get to the plaintiff; that at the time of his
conversation the price of mutton was 29lf2c per lb.
Fro1n the facts hereinafter related, it will appear
that the evidence clearly indicated that there was
no lawful contract entered into between the parties,
for 30,000 pounds of boneless m.utton at 24lf2 cents
per pound as alleged.
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3
B. TI-IE~ FACTS
The defendant is a wholesale meat ~packing corporation ·w·-ith its principal plnr0 of business at Salt Lake
City. It is a large organization doing business throughout the Intermountain area, and also the Pacific
coast. The defendant, as is the custom in the meat
packing business, employs sale·smen to find markets
for its merchandise. At the time in question· the
defendant had a sales ·office in San Francisco that
emplo~Yed 5 salesmen, one of vYhom was Domenith C.
Baso lo. ( R. 84)
~he plaintiff, 1fonte Moses, is an individual doing
business in the name of Rancho Packing Company,
with its principal .place of business at Los Angeles.
This plaintiff is a manufacturer of luncheon meats
and as such purchases various types of meat throu~h
out the country. (R. 13,40) The parties had never
before clone any business. (R.. 20)
On the 28th day of October, 1947, defendant's
s11e ·man Baso1o phoned plaintiff long distance (R. 49)
:-tnd received from -him four orders for meat. (~xhibit
9) rl'he fi1·st order was for 30,000 lbs. of boneless
mutton which was represented as presently on hand,
and in the freezer. (R. 37) Plaintiff then stated he
would l}ke an adfli tional 30,000 pounds of the same
produep shipped 3000 to 5000 pounds per week. (R.45)
Two additional orders were giYen, one for 5000
pounds- of ·pigs feet, ·and one for Gullet meat and
lamh chf'Pks. (.U.. 60, Exhibit 9)
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Order Refused
The salesman Baso1lo telephoned Mr. Me Farland, general manager of the defendant, told him· of
the orders. ( (R.88) D efendant accepted the order
for the presently existing car of frozen mutton, and
shipped 27,716 pounds the next day. (R. 88, 78, Exhibit
1) As to the second order for the same commodity,
it was refused for the reason that there was no mutton
available. (R.88) The product results from the culling of sheep herds as they move from summer to
winter pasture, and is only available in small quantity in defendant's territory from September to the
forepart of October. (R. 77) Defendant told Basolo
plaintiff could have the· product "as available" on
an open order basis. At the time Moses ordered the
second lot of mutton, Basolo told him, testified Moses,
that the latter had purchased all of the supply of
boneless mutton. (R. 45) Nevertheless, plaintiff contends that Basolo ''sold'' him the order sued upon.
Plaintiff knew that Bosolo had not conferred ·with
the r):1ant at tl1P tiTHe the al1eged contract waR entered. (R. 46) Basolo had no authority to accept orders.
His employer had instructed him to take orders and
con1municate them to the plant for acceptance. (R. 87)
There was no course of dealing between litigants, or
between the salesman and plaintiff. Moses "assumed''
Basolo had contacted the plant about the transaction.
(R. 47)
The San Francisco office sent evidence of the
1
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four transactions to defendant in the form of the
usual ''house order'' form, E~hibit 9. Plaintiff also
rPnei,.. ec +he ~flirl fnrrns. (R.. 69) The contested order
is page 4 of that exhibit, S·pecially marked Exhibit I.
On its face shipping instructions are stated to be "as
aYailable''; however_, there are later words about
minimum shipments of 3'000 pounds per week.
Phlintiff issued its purchase order, No. 7001, Exhibit
''A."~ however, there is no evidence defendant received
a copy thereof. The order number appears on a
letter written hy Basolo to· plaintiff dated October 29,
wherein the salesman undertook to confirm the order
for the second shipment of mutton in installments.
In said letter, Exhibit "B", is a statement that ''we
have advised the plant that lots of less than 3000 lbs.
are not desireable.'' The plant had been so advised,
hut rejected the order on that basis. (R, 88) The
letter said nothing about 30,000 pounds. What amounted to a counter offer was given by the pl~ant to ship
as available on an open order basis. (R. 88). Exhibit
'' B'' statrs Basolo \:\,Tas district manager. He hafl
no authority to use this title and took it on himself to so designate ·himself, the defendant knowing
nothing about it until 7 months later. (R. 105)
Shipment of the four orders commenced at once.
The order for the mutton on hand was shipped on
October ~9th, but was several thousand pounds short.
(Exhibit 1) There were six shipments of mutton
thereafter during the next few weeks, but each ship-
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ment was for le-ss than 3000 pounds. (E·xhibits 2 to 7,
inclusive) The last three were priced out higher than
the alleged order for 30,000 pounds .at 24¥2 cents, and
the plaintiff paid without question the higher price. (R.
69 and Exhibit 8)
M.oses Phones Me F~arland
Sometime near Jan nary 9, 1948, plaintiff phoned
Me F'arland and observed that he had a contract for
30,000 pounds of mutton but it wasn't coming through.
(R.. 28) Mr. 1\fc Farland stated there was no contract,
but that shi·pments had been, and would be made on an
open order basis, but that there was no product available. (R. H1)
Immediately thereafter, plaintiff wrote Exhibit "C''
rehearsing some of -vvhat it deemed to be the understanding and asked for shipments. Mr. Me Farland replied
with Exhibit "D" on January 15th and stated there
was no product, that it was almost impossible to obtain,
that there were no sheep coming to market, that he would
do his utmost to get some mutton as referred to in the
le~ter. ~tfr. 1v.Ic Farl.:1nd always understood the matter
as an ''as available'' transaction. (R. 88) All during
this time, from the shortage from 3000 ~pounds in the
first shipment to April 28, 1948, pl'aintiff was buying
the product in the open market. (R. 51, 31, 63) The
price was rising from the time of the purchase alleged
to have . been made from defendant; This plaintiff
knew. (R. 33, 52) At the time of· the phone call and
letter with and from Me Farland, the market was
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about :29~~ cents. (R. 94) A purchase of 27,680 pounds
of mutton 'Yas made by plaintiff on April 28,
19:18 at 3-1 ('C)nts, and plaintiff demanded and sued
for the difference between the alleged contract price
of ~-!~~ cents and the 3-1 cents, plus two eents for
transportation cost.
The court granted judgement as prayed.
STATE~fENT OF ERRORS

I.
The trial court erred in entering its finding that
there was a sale of 30,000 p·ounds of boneless· mutton
for the following re'asons :
1. The salesman of defendant had no authority to enter into a contract with plaintiff.
2. The defendant had a right to ·accept or
reject orders from its salesman. The order submitted by plaintiff was rejected. A counteroffer to
send ll1Utton "as available" was given in its stead.
3. :Shipments made by defendant to plaintiff
did not constitute an ·acce:ptance of any contract.
4. Defendant at no time ratified the alleged
contract made between plaintiff and s·alesman
Basolo.

II.
The pl'aintiff waived his right to damages for the
deficiencies in the first five ·shipments.

III.
Plaintiff did not properly mitigate dam·ages. The
judgment for money is excessive.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

ARGUMENT
I~

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING
ITS FINDING THAT THERE WAS A SALE Q]j.,
30,000 POUNDS OF BONELE:SS MUTTON FOR
THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
1. THE SALESMAN OF DEFENDANT
HAD NO AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO A
CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF.
The trial court found as a fact that defendant,
through its agent Basolo, sold plaintiff 30,000 pounds
of boneless mutton. (R. 9) It is contended by defendant and ap-pellant here that the agent had no
authority to so bind his principal in a sale of this
kind and that the finding is error.
At the threshold, we must examine the facts in
terms of the generally accepted principle of law stated by the Utah Supreme Court as follows:
It has been stated to be the general rule
that a traveHng salesman has no authority to
ma.ke a binding contract of sale without the
approval or acceptance of the principal, unless
expressly so authorized. Generally the extent
of his authority is to solicit orders and transmit them. FLOOR vs. MITCHELL, 41 P. 2d,
281-286, 1935_.
There was no evidence of prior dealing so that
an agency by estoppel might be claimed or an apparent agency. The transaction in question was the fir~t
ever made between the parties. ( R. 69, 20) The only
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eon1petent evidence then to establish Basolo 's authority "'"ere the instructions given him by his emp~loyer.
Ba~clo \Yn~ n ~nlt.:.6llH1n for defendant McFarl~and,
as one of five such in the San Francisco territory
sales office (R. 99, 14, 85). He had been specifically
instructed, as \Yere ·all salesman of defendant
Only t\YO persons in the defendant organization
had authority to accept orders, Paul McFarland,
g·eneral manager, and Fr·ank Lees, the sales manager.
(R 95)

Basolo assumed to use a false title, that of
District :Nianager. He was not the district manager.
~Ir. ~fcFarland, testified that Basolo took the title
"on himself to use," and that it was not until seven
months after the transaction in question and that
Basolo was no longer with the com;pany, that the
manager of defendant knew he had used the false
title. (R 105 This information came from plaintiff
in the form of Exhibit B.
Concurrently with the transactions herein taking
place, Basolo was acting as a broker for other de~aler8.
(R 86)

It is to be born in mind that statements of the
agent cannot be relied upon as to his authority for
the reason that persons dealing with an agent assume
the risk of lack of authority. 2 Am. Jur. 76.
The plaintiff has the burden of .proof of agency.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that one who has
dealt \Yith an agent or who has availed himself of
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the act of an agent must in order to charge the principal, prove the authority under which the agent acted,
in other words, it has cast upon him the burden of
establishing the agent's authority to bind the principal by the act or contract in controversy.

u

~CAMPBELL

vs. GOWANS 100 P 397, 35

268.
Mr. Moses, the plaintiff, knew that Basolo did
not have authority to make a firm contract for boneless mutton. In the first place, it is clear from the
testimony of Mr. Moses that Basolo at no time prior
to the transaction in controversy had contacted the
home office, or anyone in authority, with respect to
the order. (R 46, 47) It was the salesman acting
alone in response to the offer of plaintiff to purchase.
There was no confirmation to .plaintiff and indeed Mr.
Moses stated that in most of his deals, he does not
rely on confirmation. (R 74)
It is to be kept in mind that the order in question
was a part of four orders for meat all bearing the
same date, October 28, 1947. (Exhibit 9) It all occured in one telephone conversation from the salesman
in San Francisco, to plaintiff Moses in J_jos Angeles.
(R 20, 58, 69) The' first order was for a car load of
boneless muttbn presently existing (R 78) Mr. Moses
testified that Basolo ''offered the sale of this car load
of mutton, representing himself as being able to sell
it to us, and describing it. We agreed to buy." (R 37)
. This car load had been accumulated over several
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"\Yeeks of culling of sheep in the desert country moving

from summer to "\\"'inter range. (R 77) The salesman
ccnh{ not sf\11 th~s meat 'Yithout confirmation from
the plant. ( R 85, 87)
SENNER & J(APLAN v. GERA MILLS
173 NYS 265
. A. careful reading of the record will discose that
it "\Yas in the same telephone conversation that Mr.
~loses then asked for a second order of the same
product, in the amount of 30,000 pounds, to be shipped
weekly from 3000 to 5000 pounds :per shipment.
(R 20, 58, 69) Mr. l\foses testified that he knew he was
purchasing a scarce commodity that was in some
sections unavailable at some times of the year (R 52);
that "certain sections. would dry up" when the
packers were ''through · with their run. ' ' ( R 41)
Boneless mutton he said "isn't an all-year proposition in any one section . . . In a sheep section like
this (Utah) it's an item that comes for a time and
then stops off . . . these mutton are old ewes that
have been culled for1n the herds.'' (R 41)
The salesman Basolo telephoned the two orders
to McFarland for confirmation. (R 88) The first
order for the boneless mutton on hand was accepted
and was shipped the following day. (R 88, 79, Exhibit
1) The order for the second lot of mutton was rejected as follows :
A. Basolo said that Rancho Pack would
also take another thirty thousand pounds of
mutton if we could get it, and I immediately
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told' him it wasn't available . . . . We said
we didn't have another thirty thousand pounds
of mutton, w~ .probably couldn't get it, but
that we would ship on an open order all the
boneless mutton we eould get through." (R 88)
Plaintiff bought the product regularly and testified it was always available somewhere. (R 41) He
testified he could have purchased mutton elsewhere
on October 28, 1947, at the same price. ( R 46) He
bought in the South and from Chicago generally.
(R40)

At the time of the telephone conversation with
Basolo wherein the carload of existing mutton was
ordered, and after Mr. Moses had offered to purchase
another 30,000 pounds, Mr. Moses testified that Basolo
told him that he, Mr. Moses, had "bought our supply,
you have already bought our present supply.'' (R
45, 46) However, Mr. Moses then testified that the
salesman was confident that more supply V\rould be
. 'avail~able. lie testified Basolo had said:
" . . . . but we do have these coming up.
We are going to have them right along every
week. We are in no position to accumulate a
shipment of twenty five or thirty thousand
pounds, but we will have them coming in each
week. Now would you be satisfied to receive
five thousand pounds per' week~" (R 45)
It is submitted that in terms of the record, the
above testimony, and that immediately- following, cannot be believed; but if it is accepted, Moses should
have checked with the plant. Mr. Moses said:
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••You ran send us as little as three thousand pounds, but no less than that. He said,
••On that basis I will contract with you to meet
the operat1on. \v""e have a truck coming in each
"·eek and "·ill drop off three to five thousand
pounds each week'' and I insisted on conveying to him that if he failed to do that he would
be putting us on a spo.t be·cause we had possibilit·ies at that tinte of buy~ing mutton at that
price .. , (R 46)
Here we have the ·plaintiff advised that there is

no more presently existing supply; plaintiff further
understands the difficulties in the desert country of
procuring· supply, kno\Ying that some areas dry up at
the end of the season's run, knowing that he can get
it in some other locality at the same price. And yet
he \vas willing to try to enter a contract with a mere
salesman for that large quantity of a scarce item!
Apparent authortity is never contructed from such
tenuous tissue! ''One should always use proper
vigilence in dealing with another; he cannot close his
eyes to information -vvhich lies within his easy· grasp.''
Angerosa v. ··White Co., 290 N.Y.S. 204, 248 App. Div. 425.
Johnson v. Shook & Fletcher Supply Co.,
16 So. 2d, 406.
Plaintiff ~foses had had no course of dealing with
Basolo, nor with 1fcFarland. This was the first and
only transaction with either of them. (R 20, 34, 45,
58) And pla.intiff knew that there was no immediately
avaih1 ble stock of. mutton to support the order. He
himself testified that he was so advised by the sales-
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man. (R 45, 46) Why should plaintiff undertake
to tie up such a large supply at the wrong season of
the year, · through a salesman who had advised him
of the lack of present supply, when plaintiff knew
that he could get his product at the same price in
another market~ He had notice that it would be required of defendant to get the product from mutton
then on the hoof. ( 45) It was not ·contemplated that
the salesman was to enter the market for the .purchase
of processed mutton. It was that weekly supply they
were evidently talking about.
Mr. Moses is a large operator. The order from
defendant is "but a drop in the bucket", (R 38), and
he. had another supply, (R 46), yet he saw fit to deal
with a traveling salesman who actually had no authority, and who put the plaintiff on notice that there
was no present ability to perform. Plaintiff had
notice that it was a future anticipated supply to be
depended upon.
Moses testified that the contract was formed in
the telephone conversation. (R 49) This was before
any attempted confirmation by Basolo with the plant.
,In other words, plaintiff takes position and the court
below so found (R 6) that the salesman had the
authority to contract at the time of the first telephone
conversation, that it was unnecessary for the latter
to get assent from the plant.
· Let it also be remembered that Basolo did telephone the plant immediately thereafter. He received
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(1) confirmation of the first order for boneless
mutton, and (~) refusal of the order for the sceond
lot of the same product for the reason that none was
aYailable. ( R. 88) In other vvords, any possible
authority the sales1nan n1ight be· held to have had at
the tin1e of the telephone conversations to sell the
future prospective supply of boneless mutton, was
specifically countermanded by Mr. McFarland.
Plaintiff had a duty to inguire into the authority
of the salesman.

''A person dealing with a known agent is
not authorized under any circumstances blindly
to trust the agent's statements as to the extent
of his powers; such person must not act negligently, but must use reasonable diligence and
prudence to ascertain whether the agent acts
within the scope of his powers. In other words,
a person dealing with an ·agent assumes the
risk of lack of authority in the agent. He cannot charge the principal by relying upon the
agent's assun1ption of authority which proves
to be unfounded." 2 Am. J ur. 76
Dayton Bread Co. v. Montana Flour Co. 126
F2 257, 1942
Johnson v. Shook & Fletcher Supply Co.,
16 So. 2d, 406.
ANHEUSER BU.SI-I v. GROVIER STARR,
128 F.2, 146.
CHESSOM v. RICI-IMOND CEDAR
VVORKS, 89 S.E. 800.
American N·at. Bank v. B·artlett, 40 F.2, 21.
WHEELER v. McGUIRE, 2 L.R.A. 808;
86 Ala. 398 ; 5 s.o. 190.
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As to whether the agent was acting within the
scope of his authority, suppose he had ~een given an
order for 300,000 or even three million pounds of
critical material~ Could it be said then that plaintiff
could believe that the salesman was acting within the
scope of his pow~rs ~
I-Iad plaintiff made any inquiry, or even called
Basolo back .after the latter had communicated the
orders to the plant, he would have learned whether
the salesman was acting within or without his powers.
Of course it is the position of plaintiff that Basolo
did not attempt to con tract in the telephone conversatio;n prior to his conferring with the plant; however,
plaintiff grounds his whole case on the assumption
that Basolo had the authority at the time of· the
single phone conversation, and that the contract was
then and there made. (R. ,49) The -court bel9w so
found. (R. 6)
If Mr. Moses had been really concerned about tieing up a source of supply (amounting to a drop in
the bucket) he woulQ. have determined whether or
not the plant had or would sanction an order amounting to 72,000 pounds of a critical commodity. (R. 38)
Mr. Moses testified that he knew at the time of the
order that the salesman was not conferring with the
plant, that Moses did 'nt have any staternent from
Basolo · with respect to his arrangement with
McFarland
in California." (R. 46) In fact, Mr.
Th1oses testified that there W'as nothing said about the
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salesrnan conferring 'Yith l\lr. 1\feFarland in Salt Lake
City, .but 1\lr. 1\[oses, ~~certainly assumed that he
had." (R. 47)
Johnson v. Shook & Fletcher Supply Co.,
16 So. 2d, 406.
The letter 'Yritten by Basolo, (Exhibit B), did
not haYe authority of the plant and it does not on
its face suggest it. All that i's said is that the plant
has been . 'advised'' that lots of less than 3000 pounds
are not desirable. Whether this letter was written
before or after the instructions from McFarland is
now kno\\-n. But it is clear that there was no author,
i ty from the plant to write it.
That the salesman did not confer with the plant
before making ·the alleged contract wa.s of no concern
to plaintiff, for he testified that it was not his practice to attem-pt confirn1ation. He testified that he did
a lot of business with l~arge brokerage houses of
the nation, and that "in most cases the transactions
that I have had with them have been done without
confirmation." (R. 74) Confirmation with him vvas
uncon1mon. (R.71) With defendant a must. (R. 87)
The importance of confirmation was illustrated
in the record by defendant's counsel calling attention
to plaintiff of a statement appearing on the letterhead of the brokerage firm with which plaintiff did
the business of purchasing in the open market to
"mitigate" his damages as a result of the failure of
this defendant to ship the mutton. Mr. Moses stated
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he was familiar with the language and policy of the
James Company that ''all' our offerings, verbal,
telegraph or mail, are subject to seller's confirmation
unless specifically quoted firm." (R. 74) In other
words, the James Company required confirmation of
the buyer from it, with the seller. The buyer was and .
is warned by that plain spoken language that where
there was no ttemp~t to get a sellers confirmation,
there was no contract. The broker is in a somewhat
similar position as a salesman. The house, or the
plant reserved the right to affirm or disaffirm the
orders taken by the broker. And why not~
· Where would the large modern · plant be if it
did not require salesman to submit ·their orders~
When the demand exceeds the supply, as was the case
in 1947 ( R. 87), salesman and brokers could over sell
the supply and produce chaos. It is the rule in all
business that a mere traveling salesman does not
commit the supplier in the absence of a firm quotation or offering. Credit considerations if nothing
else, would dictate that the ordinary salesman could
not of himself close a contract for goods involving
many thousand of dollars.
Wrenn v. Ehrlich 194 A. 534
Senner & Ka:plan v. Gera Mills, 173 N.Y.S.
265, 185 App. Div.. 562
Under the pleadings of plaintiff, his proof, and
the findings of the trial court, the case is one where a
bi-lateral contract is clain1ed and found to exist, that
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is, a p-romise for a promise. The promise from defendant 'vould either have to come from the salesman
having authority, or, inconsistent with the findings of
the court, the act of shipping by defendant would constitute promise to ship all of the ordered merchandise.
The court found it came from the salesman 'B authority.
There 'Yas never a bi-lateral agreement. Basolo
did not promise anything, and even though he had
he had no authority to promise. The shipments made
were on the basis of the instruction given Basolo when
he phoned the plant, that there was no available supply,
but that such as could be had would be shipped on
an open order basis. (R. 88) The court may have had
such a formation of contract in its mind, but there is
no find_ing to that effect. The finding is to the contrary, that the agreement was the immediate result
of the phone conversation. (R. 6)
\Vhat actually happened w.as that plaintiff simply
made an offer for a bi-lateral contract which was rejected. A counter offer was given by the plant that
as there was no firm supply available, the order
would be filled on an open -order basis. (R. 88) The
plaintiff had the duty to ascertain the scope of
authority of the salesman, and the salesman had the
instructions forth,vith. The buyer from the s·alesman
buys at his peril as heretofore stated. If the agent
has no authority, the intending buyer does not buy.
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Rietz vs. Martin, 12 Ind. 306, 74 Am. Dec. 215, 24
R.C.L. 387.
The result of what happened in October, 1947,
was that there was set up a series of unilateral contracts. The salesman had no authority but to communicate the order, and that he did. Anything further
that he did was a nulity.
The law of the pl·ace of contracting, California,
requires that Basolo's authority must be in writing
before the contract would be valid under the .Statute
of Frauds.
The California Civil Code 2309 provides as follows:
''An oral authorization is sufficient for
any purpose except that an authority to enter
with a written contract required by law to be
in writing can only be given by an instrument
in writing.
Section 1624 as amended Statute 1905 states:
''The following contracts are invalid unless the same or some note or memorandum
thereof, is in writing and subscribed by the
party to be charged or his agent.
(4) An agreement for the sale of goods,
chattels, or things in action at .a price not less
than $200.00.
Seymour v. Oelrichs, 106 P. 88 is the leading
California case on this point, holding that an agent's
authority to enter into a contract that is required
by law to be in writing also must be in writing.
This ca.se also holds that proof that an agent had
authority to bind his principal by son1e sort of a
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"\Yritten contract does not, in the absence of proof of
"~ritten authority, justify the inference that the· 'agent
had authority to bind the princip·al by a contract required to be in "'Titip.g under the Statute of Frauds.
In the present case there was no probative
evidence of the agents authority shown whatsoever by
the plaintiff, Moses, the only evidence being the
statements of Paul McFarland on Pages 85 and 8'7
as to the instructions he gave to Basolo.
Another n1ore recent case applying this law of
California on agency is the case of Georgia Peanttt
Co. v. FaJJlO Products Company, 96 F. (2) 440 in
which the court stated "In our opinion the provisions
of the California Code Sections a.re subject to but one
interpretatio~, that is, that every one exercising an
authority to sell or buy, save the specifically excluded auctioneer, whether a broker or any other class
of agent, must have written authority to enter into
a contract required to be in writing.''
It is submitted that there is nothing in the record
exhibiting that the sales1nan had any authority to
sell anything to this plaintiff. The court interrogated
l)aul ~'lcFarland at the end of the trial. Note the
question of the court on the final page of the transcript:

Q. The court:
It appears clear to me
that these agents have authority to sell the
n1erchandise if the plant has it on hand. The
HL'·ent calls and finds out. If he doesn't have it,
tht·~T :-;ay, '' Uet dovvn and make your apologies.''
()
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If they do have it on hand, they fill the bill.
Is that about it."
·
A. Yes, that's about it.
Q. The court:
Yes, it seems to me it
is clear. The only question now is what the
legal effect of that is on these fellows that
think they are buying the goods. (R. 110)
Any intelligent· understanding of the above answer
by Mr. McFarland requires the reader to recall the
burden of the rest of his testimony that in all cases,
he, Mr. McFarland, instructed the salesman to com. municate orders to him for confirationm. (R. 85, 87,
108) In this case it is undisputed and clear that at
the time of the formation of the alleged contract
''the plant did not have the p·roduct on hand.''
Evidently the court was very concerned about the
''fellows that think they are buying the goods.'' It
is not uncommon for intending buyers to be .disappointed in the unavailabiltiy of goods desired.
But the court inquiry brought out the essential fact
that where there is no supply the agent has no authority to sell. (R. 110) Here, there was no supply.
Here there was no authority to sell. Here there is no
contract.
2. TI-IE DEFENDANT HAD A RIGHT TO
ACCEPT OR REJECT ORDERS FROM ITS
SALE·SMAN. THE ORDER SUBMITTED B\~
PLAINTIFF WAS REJECTED. A COUNTEROFFER TO SEND 1\{UTTON ''AS AVAILABLE''
WAS GIVEN IN ITS STEAD.
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Plaintiff contends and the rourt found that jt
receiYed 6635 pounds and that defendant failed in its
contract to deliYPr 23,365 pounds of meat, for which it
"~as entitled to enter the market, purchase same, and
charge defendant with the difference between the 241/2
cents and the n1arket. On April 28, 1948, when plaintiff
entered the market and purchased, it paid 36 cents
per pound, n1aking a claimed loss of $2,686.98, for
'vhich it sued, and recovered judgment, against defendant. Defendant takes the position that there was
no contract betvveen the parties which was enforceable
by law.
In the first place it must be understood that the
commodity attempted to be purchesed by plaintiff and
\Yhich is the subject of this suit was virtually impossible
to obtain in defendant's territory. The undertaking
by defendant was that it would supply the mutton "as
available."
Defendant's salesman from San Francisco called
plaintiff Thfoses by phone in Los Angeles on the 28th
day of October, 1947, and took four orders for meat.
(Exhibit 9) That there was but one contract het\\Teen
Basolo, salesman for plaintiff, and Moses, is clear jn
the record u.pon careful analpsis. (R. 20, 35, 38, 45,
58)
The first of the four orders was for 30,000 pounds
of boneless mutton which defendant had accumulated
and had on hand; it was in cold storage. (R. 78)
Plaintiff Moses testified ''l-Ie (Basolo) offered the
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sale of this carload of mutton, representing himself as
being able to sell it to us, and describing it . . . We
agreed to buy it.'' (R. 37)
Paul McFarland, general manager of defendant,
testified as to that order that Basolo telephoned hin1
and said:
''I have an order for the boneless mutton
you have in the freezer . . . . You can ship it
and Basolo ga.ve me a purchase order number,
which we attached to our invoice .... That .
merchandise was shipped immediately.'' (R. 88)
The order number used was plaintiff's No. 7465.
The invoice is Exhibit 1. Mr. Frank Lees, sales
manager for defendant, testified that the car was
loaded and shipped to plaintiff on October 29th. (R. 79)
The car sent to plaintiff was accumulated "between
the latter part of August and the end of October,"
(R. 78), and represented all of the stock of that
product held by defendant, so testified Mr. Moses.
(R. 45) This shipment was received and paid for,
and is not the subject of this suit.
Contemporaneously with the giving of the above
order (R. 45, 38), there vvas an order placed for an
additional 30, 000 pounds, and it ·is as to this latter
order that the present controversy arises. The pertinent testimony from McFarland is as follows:
Q. Now what else was said~ (after g1v1ng
the first order)
A. Basolo said that Rancho Pack would
also take another thirty thousand pounds of
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mutton if "~e could get it, and I immediately
told him it '"asn 't available. \~V e said we didn't
have another thirty thousand pounds of mutton,
'Ye probably couldn't get it, but that we would
ship on an open order all the boneless mutton
"?e could get through. ( R. 88)
:Jir. ~Ioses had another version of the second
order for boneless mutton, testifying:

Q. I 'vant you to state the conversation
you had with 1\ilr. Basolo with respect to the
second ca1-load of meat.
A. He said that ''you have bought our
sup.ply, but 've do have these -coming up. We
are going to have them coming right along
every week. (sheep) We are in no position
to accumulate a shipment of twenty-five or
thirty thousand pounds, but we will have them
coming in each week. Now, 'vould you be
satisfied to receive five thousand pounds per
week~ I said, ''yes, in fact you can send as
little as three thousand but no less than that."
He said on that basis I will contract with you
to meet that operation. We have a truck coining in each week and will drop off three to
five thousand pounds each week," and I insisted on conveying to him that if he failed
to do so that he would be putting us on a spot
because we had possibilities at that time of
buying mutton at that price. (R. 46) They
will guarantee to deliver three to five thousand
pounds each week. (R. 47)
Q. You didn't have any statement from
Mr. Basolo with respect to his arrangement
with McFarland in California~
A. No.
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Q. He sim:ply told you that ''you have
already bought our present supply~''
A. That is right. (R. 46)
As to the documentary evidence involved the
following are pertinent: Plaintiff Moses testified that
he had seen the four house orders comprising Exhibit
9, (R. 69), the first one of which is defendant's record
of the first order for boneless mutton at 25 cents per
pound. The ~econd page of the document is for other
meat, The third page of the document is for 5000
pounds of pigs feet at 9 cents per pound. The fourth
page is for the merchandise which is the subject of
this suit, 30,000 additional .pounds of boneless mutton
at 24¥2 eents.
It is to be noted that all four "house orders" in
Exhibit 9 bear the same date. October 28, 1947, showing
that all business was done during the same day. The
exhibit came from plaintiff's .San Francisco offi~e.

(R. 107)
An examination of the fourth page of Exhibit 9,
which has been m·arked also as Exhibit I, (R. 71),
discloses that there is a statement as to "When ship".
It was ship "as available". At the trial, plaintiff was
glad to have the exhibit available from defendant because of the language appearing thereon as follows:
''Ship each week in lots of no less then
3000 lbs.
More if available."
The import of the Exhibit 1 of course cannot be
minimized, as it represents the transaction according
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to the reeords of the San Francisco office of dRfendant. (R. ~)~, 107) Plaintiff testified that he had
received copies of the said records also.. (R. 69) He
therefore had actual knowledge that in the internal
handling of the iten1, it wa.s being treated, as to
delivery date, as an ''as available'' transaction.
Johnson v. Shook & Fletcher Supply 16 So.
2d. 406.
The final additional document evidencing the
transaction in question is Exhibit ,., B '', a letter written
on defendant's stationary to plaintiff and signed by
Basolo. Note that the latter used the title "District
Manager". This he vvas not. (R. 105)
things are important in connection with
Exhibit "B". The first relates to the authority of
Basolo. This subject is hereinbefore dealt with at
length. It is clearly there demonstrated that Basolo
was but an ordinary traveling salesman., with
authority only to ''take orders and sell merchandise
after he received confirmation from the packing house
as to the availability and the price". (R. 86)
Acceptance and confirmation of orders from salesman
was required because at the time in question there
was an insufficient supply of product to satisfy the
demand. (R .87) Confirmation was the busineRs
custom. Plaintiff Moses knew when he ordered the
Recond 30,000 pounds of boneless mutton that there
was no supply. He was told by the salesman that
plaintiff "had bought our supply." (R. 45, 46)
T\YO
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The second important aspect of Exhibit '' B '' is
that it states not that the defendant had confirmed the
order, but simply that "We have advised the plant
that lots of less than 3000 lbs. are not desirable because of your .production schedule''. In other words,
there is nothing here to announce to plaintiff that the
plant, has agreed to the shipment of not less than 3000
pounds per week. It is a V·olunteer statement from
a salesman to his patron ahead of confirmation by
his employer as to what might be desirable. Basolo
assumed to make the confirmation, and did so without authority. He did not have authority to write the
letter or confirm the shipment. His instructi'ons were
positively to the contrary. (R. 88)
At no time during the conversation between Basolo
and Moses did Basolo represent that he had authority from McFarland to commit for the second shipment, so stated Mr. Moses. In fact, Mr. Mos~s testified to the contrary:
Q. You didn't have any statement from
Mr. Basolo with respect to his arrangement
A. No.
Qo Mr. Basolo didn't tell you that he had
conferred with Mr. McFarland did he~ There
was nothing said about that was ther.e~
A. Well, there was nothing said about
it, but it certainly was · assumed that he had.
(R. 47)

The salesman assumed to confirm the order by his
letter of. October 9. But if he did not have authority.
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to confirm, the letter is a nulity. The salesman's
statement that '~,Ye \Yill ship" is worth nothing unless
the salesman had actual or apparent authority. He
had neither.
Johnson v. Shook & Fletcher Supply 16 So.
2d. 406.
But even if it be assumed, that he did have some
authority, the in1port of Exhibit· 9; page 4, is not
disposed of, but clearly shows that the office of tlie
defendant at San Francisco treated in the main the
transaction as an ''as available'' deal. It was treated
in the same light by the plant, and should be so treated by this court.
The parties were dealing, and knew they were,
for a commodity not then in existence. Moses knew
that he had purchased all of the existing supply of
boneless mutton. (R. 45) Moses further knew that
certain areas of production of boneless mutton would
''dry up" and that "it isn't an all-year proposition
in anv•' one sectjon." It comes for a time and then
stops. (R. 41, 77)
It was said in Lester v. Superior Motor Car, 117
Fed 2d 780 that:
''. . . .where the purchaser has equal and
available means for information and no fraud
or artifice was used to prevent inquiry or investigation, there is a basis for the ap.plication
of the rule of caveat emptor."
See also Sm,ith V. H ollingBworth, 96 So~ 394
"If the relation of principal and agent did
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not exist but they were merely traders dealing
with each other as such and, . . .at arms length,
there would exist no grounds for the complainant's suit. For neither law nor equity relieves against one's own credulousness and inexcusable indifference to one's own interest in
a transaction where one has no legal right to
rely upon the statements, representations, and
descriptions of another· in the negotiations."
Anheuser Bush v. Grovier Starr, 128 F. 2d.

146

.

During this critical time of supply, defendant did
not ship the contested product to any other buyer
than plaintiff. There was none available. (R. 103)
It was only natural that the salesman in writing up the
house order on the transaction stated in that important shipping instruction, to ship "as available". Those
had been his instructions. · (R. 88) It is clear from
the added langu~ge that plaintiff's order number 7001
called for the shipment of no less than 3000 pounds.
This was clearly what plaintiff desired. But the order
as communicated to the plant was, according to the
shipping instructions, an ''as available'' transaction.
Mr. Basolo had been instructed specifically that there
was no product available. (R. 88) Plaintiff's 1\ft.
Moses knew this to be a fact. ( R. 45) Any atteinpt to
wheedle out of a mere salesman a firm committment
in such a state of supply, and in the face of positive
knowledge that the salesman had no instructions from
the plant as to the deal, is of itself not only ridiculous
on its face, but a patent failure to effect a binding
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eontraet. ''Tith the .product unavailable, the plaintiff
and sales1nan kno\\'ing it was unavailable; with the
salesman not getting a confirmation from the plant;
\Yith specific instructions from the general manager
to the salesman that he should not contract except
on an open order basis; with the salesman making his
O\Yn record on on '"as available'' basis and the plaintiff
haYing notice thereof; and "vith him assuming to write
an unauthorized letter of confirmation to the buyer,
\\-herein he sho·w's that he has not communicated with
the plant, sin1ply observing that he has "advised the
plant, that lots of less than 3000 pounds are not desirable", the transaction cannot be twisted into ~a fir1n
promise to deliver 30,000 pounds of mutton on any schedule.
Everything about the transaction, except the verbal
testimony of :l\1:oses, points to shipments on a condition,
a condition precedent. The product would only be sent
if it was available. As long a.s the condition was not
met there could be no contract. . The following defination of a condition precedent has the support of
rnany authorities:
''a condition precedent is one that is to be
performed before the agreement becomes effective and which calls for the happening of som.e
event or the performance of some act after the
terms of the contract have been agreed upon,
before the contract shall be binding on the
parties.'' Atl. Pac . Oil v. Gas Development Co.
69 p 2d 755
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''A condition p,recedent is one which must
be performed before the agreement of the parties becomes a valid and binding contract.
Whether a condition is precedent depends upon the intent of the parties, and this is to be
gathered from the context.'' Mcisaac v. Hale,
132 A. 916, 1926
In this case, the condition was to ship ''as a vailable". Shipments were made on that basis. Defendant
shipped boneless mutton to no other person during the
time in question than plaintiff. (R. 103) But on the
other hand, the reservation in the engagement of this
condition prevented any mutually binding contract from
coming into existence. The defendant was not bound ,
to make shipments if the product was unavailable.
''as the plaintiff was not bound to make
deliveries under the contract therefore, it vvas
void for lack of mutuality in so far as it provided for future sale or purchase. 'I'he law is
well settled that where a contract for the future
delivery of personal property confers upon
either party an arbitrary right of cancellation prior to delivery, it is lacking in mutuality and will be held binding ·upon the parties
only to the extent that it has been performed.
And, with respect to distributors contracts,
. . . . It is equally well settled that such
a contract which does not bind the manufacturer to sell and deliver, and which is terminable
at will, imposes no liability upon him if he
terminates it or refuses to make deliveries to
the dealer. Motor ·Car Supply vs. General
I-Iousehold Utilities Co. 80 F2 167.
Also see Jordon v. Buick Motor Co. 75 F2
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Cosby Hodges Milling Co. v. Riley 149 So.
612
. A_n • as available'' transaction does not bind
the shipper and any engagement to ship based on such
an illusory pron1ise, could not be binding on either
party. California Ref. vs. Producers Refini?g Co. 76
Pac. 2d, 553, 25 Cal. Apl. 2, 104
The word ''available'' as defined by W ebsters
N e"~ International Dictionary 2nd edition, means: ''At
disposal, accessable, or attainable, a.s tickets, available on that day. Synonym: ready, handy, convenient, usua.ble, obtainable." The word available in
a coal case involving suit for failure to pay royalties
for failure to \York a mine, was treated as follows:
j,

''What is available and merchantable coal'?
lTnder the terms of the lease fairly and reasonably construed, available coal includes coal recoverable as practical and reasonable mining
proposition, considering actual conditions cost,
and all the surrounding circumstances''. Big
,.,..ein Pocahontas v. Browning 120 So. E. 247,
252
Immediately after the order was given, it was
communicated to the defendant who rejected it as
given. (R. 88) A counter offer was made by the
general manager. The counter offer was communicated to the salesman, and was reflected in the house
order, Exhibit 9, page 4, marked Exhibit 1. · This
counter offer was to the effect that mutton would be
shipped only as available. It is submitted that any
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agreement bottomed on the proposition that the
offeree shall perform only as a commodity is available,
is lacking in mutuality and consideration. There was
what may be called a "qualified" acceptance of the
offer as made by the plaintiff, or there was a counter
offer; in either event the ''as available" fact of the
situation was a new ingredient.
1, Williston on
Contract, Rev. Ed, 144 As long as there was such uncertainly in the performance of ~he contract as the
obligation to deliver only if available, there could be
no binding contract for future performance. And. so
it is said the alleged contract was void for want of
mutuality. Mutuality only comes into the case because
the court below found that a contract resulted, and
that partial shipments were made pursuant to that
contract.
In ·a California case where ·parties thought they
were contracting for the refining of oil, the court
pointed out that while the refinery agreed to process
a certain amount of product per day, yet the producer
-vvas not required to rnake available to the refinery any
crude oil, and hence there "\Vas no contract for lack
of 1nutuality.
"It is uniform-ally held that a , contract
which reserves in either party an option to
deliver or to accept personal property, or
which contracts for future delivery of personal
property, the quantity of which delivery is
dependent upon the will, wish, or desire of the
other party, is void for lack or consideration
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and mutuality." California Ref. Co. v. Producers Refining Corp. 76 P2 553, 25 Cal. Apl. 2d,
. 104.
Defendant shipped on an open order basis, the
follo,ving boneless mutton to .plaintiff. Note that not
a single ship1nent corresponds to what the plaintiff
claims he had a firm promise to receive:

Date Shipped

Quantity Shipped Price Exhibit No.
Pounds
November 11, 1947 ________ 2,851.
2
24%
November 15, 1947 ________ 1,084
3
24%
November 22, 1947________ 1,200
4
24%
November 29, 1947 ________ 400
5
24%
December 6, 1947__________ 664
6
24%·
January 31, 1948__________ 332
25
7
~ ote

that there is a major deviation In the
amount of the shipment on the contested order with
all but the first, and as to that, there is a shortage of
one hundred fifty pounds. Note that as to three of the
six shipments, that the price was not that claimed to
have been agreed upon. If there was a contract, why
did plaintiff pay the added rate per pound, and accept
the short shipments~ The record discloses that ~plain
tiff paid his bill regularly and without protest. (R. 89)
An examination of Exhibit 8, which is the ledger of
defendant, discloses the date when all charges were
made on the above items, and when they were paid.
The merchandise "\Vas paid for on the basis of the
billing.
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Defendant never treated the transaction at any
time as one binding on it. Paul McFarland testified
that it was always his understanding that he was to
ship on an "open order (R. 88, 96), "as available."
What would have been the status if the evidence
was that McFarland agreed: ''I will send you the
mutton in installments if I can find it"~ If Mr.
Moses made a contract with an automobile dealer
to deliver a certain make of car ''if he could get
one", he would have little chance of prevailing in a
suit for damages. The contract would he void for
want of mutuality. If the car was produced and delivered within a reasonable time, a unilateral contract would have resulted; but ahead of the finding
and delivery of- the car, there was no enforceable
contract. In this case, the undelivered meat was
never available, and there could never be a contract
e~cept for the price if the commodity were actually
delivered.
In this record, it cannot be doubted that the defendant intended at the time to have delivery cond~
tional. So far as defendant was concerned it has to
,be on that basis. It would have been insanity for it
to contra.ct otherwise. For plaintiff to attempt to
make such a contract with a mere salesman, with no
checking with the plant, was folly. Knowing there
vvas no supply, it could not rely on the representation
of a mere salesman to make a firm committment.
Plaintiff knew, or should have kno,vn, that the sale~-
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man \Ya.s being put out on a limb to undertake to bind
the plant to an in1possible performance. There was
never a n1eeting of the minds on a firm promise for
a promise. There \Yas an order given and accepted
on a condition precedent that there should be available a supply. The condition attached defeated the
formation of a binding contract, and in its stead
left the parties without a contract.
The simple law of formation of contracts requires
a meeting of the minds. Todorovich v. Kinnickinnic
1\fut. Loan Assn. 135 A.L.R. 818, 298 NW 226 238 Wis. 39.
That court said :
"To constitute an acceptance and the
creation of ·a contract there must be a meeting
of the minds upon all essential terms thereof. \\There an ·acceptance varies from the offer
in respect to such terms it amounts to a rejection of the offer and the submission of a
counter proposal without forming a contract
unless the party making /the offer renews it
and agrees to the suggested modifications.''
Here there was an offer in the form of plaintiff's
purchase order, (Exhibit "A"), or better, the conversation with Basolo. This offer was never accepted
by one with authority; and the evidence from the San
Francisco office in the form of the house orders,
(Exhibit 9), communicated at the time to both plaintiff and defendant by the salesman, sho"\\7 ed that he
treated the order not as a firm committment. Certainly in the first stages of the transaction there W'as no
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semblence of an authorized acceptance of the offer.
Everything points to the existence of a condition being
attached to the transaction. Thus we have a counter
offer stating a condition. There is nothing in the
record which shows acceptance by plaintiff of the
condition, which proves there could be no -contract.
And even if ,plaintiff did accept the condition, it
would still lack mutuality and consideration and would
not qualify as a binding contract. In truth and in fact,
the minds of the litigants never met in establishing
a firm committment to deliver personal property
virtually impossible of abtaining. Ajax Holding Co.
v. Heinsbergen 149 P2 189
Defendant agreed to deliver plaintiff mutton as
available, and this he faithfully did. To construct over
the heads of the :parties ,a bi-lateral contract is unfair and not reflective of the true intents of the
parties, and the practices of the packing industry.
The court committed error In finding a contract
existed and assessing damages for breach therP0f. The
lo \!Ver court should be reversed.
3. :SHIPMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT
TO PLAINTIFF DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN
AC·CEPTANCE OF ANY CONTRACT.
The trial court entered findings that the contract
came into being in the telephone conversation. (R. 6)
We have undertaken hereinbefore to prove the court
was in error. I:Iovv-ever, it might be argul•d that ~as a
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consequence of the shipments of the mutton, there was
an acceptance of an offer.
e here dispute that any
shipment made by defendant constituted an ·acceptance
of any outstanding offer, or resulted in any oblgation
of rontract other than for pl·aintiff to pay the price for
the goods accepted.
It n1ay be ·argued that by defendant shi:pping under
the original offer, it became bound to ship all of the
30,000 pounds ordered. In the first place, .what evidence
is there in the record that defendant at the time knevv
there was a firm offer for 30,000 p·ounds ~ There is no
evidence that McFar~and received a copy of plaintiff's
order number 7001, Exhibit ''A''. However, defendant
received Exhibit I, which is page 4 of Exhibit 9.
We can be sure that Basolo phoned McFarland and
told him of the two orders, the first of which was accepted ·and shipped immediately. The second ·Order '\\ as
declined except on the basis of an open order. (R. 88)
Plaintiff may argue that by shipping 2851 pounds as in
Exhibj t 2 there \vas an acceptance of the whole order.
It vvonld take ·a. tortured interpretation of the facts for
the rourt to g.o along with the view when under the
circumstances, the supply \Vas so much in doubt. I-T ad
there been no question of supply, it might be argued
that acceptance was presumed by shipping the first
installment. But enough has been s·aid to sho'\\r that
plaintiff was on notice of the impossibility of. full performance, and hence no im:plication of an intention to
do a vrtually impossible thing should be entertained.

''T

7
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Almost the same precise f~aets accompany the order
for 5000 pounds of pigs feet given at the same time.
(Exhibit 9, page 3) ·The plaintiff Moses testified that
he ordered that quantity of pigs feet from Basolo, but
that it was no "contract." (R. 62) It w·as an "order"
he said. How is it not also a contract if the mutton was
a contract~ The defendant shipped pigs feet on the
5000 pound order as follows:
Date Shvp ped
Quantity
Price Exhibit No.
N ovemher 15, 1947__________ 627lbs.
9c
3
November 22, 1947__________ 728lbs.
lOc
4
November 29, 1947__________ 314lbs.
15c 5
December 6, 1947____________ 129lbs.
6
10c
If the court below took the position that it was the
conduct of the plant in actually shipping on the first
installment of the order that brought the contract for
mutton into being, then there should also be found 'a
contract existed for the shipment of pigs feet. There
was a shipment, and in the first instance, it "ras at the
price offered. Why didn't plaintiff enter suit for pigs
feet not shipped and for a refund for over charging~
Under the thinking of plraintiff, and the trial court in
the mutton facts, there was a contract for pigs feet!
Yet plaintiff said there was no contract, there was
simply an "order". Why and where is the difference~
1

The pigs feet trans·action illustrates the real method
of business followed by not only the litigants, but by
the packing industry. The packing house is dependent
on the sup ply· from the farms; and packing houses do
1
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not blindly guarantee delivery. They ship what they can
in the absence of strict agreement. Plaintiff ordered
5000 pounds of pigs feet and g·ot 1798 pounds. He didn't
mind the difference in price either. Plaintiff ordered
30,000 pounds of boneless mutton in the first deal and
got 27,700: in the second transaction, he ordered 30,000
lbs. and got 6,635 and he didn't mind the change in the
price. In no case did plain tiff bother with ~>'rocurring a
firm committment at the outs-et. There cannot be impliea
an acceptance of a contract to ship 30,000 pounds of mutton without also implying the same for the pigs feet, and
the court cannot imply a contract for the pigs feet because ~[r. Moses specifically said there was not such.
(R. 62)
The only way to treat the transactions is as a
''divisible offer requesting a series of acts to be given
from tin1e to time. If an offer is of this divisible character, it may be revoked not only before ·any acceptance
but also as to any portion of the offer still unaccepted
even after acceptance of some of the se~ies of ·transactionR .proposed by the offer" says Mr. Williston ·a:t
page 163 of Volume 1 of his revised edition on contracts.
The honorable trial judge made a conscientious
effort to arrive at the true practice of the defendant
and thP industry. The crux of the ca.se is probably
contained in the last three pages of the record. Mr.
lVIcFarland t.estified in response to a question from the
court concerning vvhat he had tol~ the salesman as follows:
''. . . the salesmen including B•a.solo ''are to ·
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go out and try to find a market for our merchandise and never to oversell our production.
Now, salesmen can go out and offer this merchandise, and if the buyer accepts the salesman's
offer, he comes back to the plant for confirmation.''
Q. By the court: And you always confirm
it if you have got it on hand~
A. We confirm it by either filling the order
or rejecting it.
Q. By the court: If you have it on hand, do
you ever reject~
.
A. Well, if there is orders ·ahead of it, we
probably would reject it. First orders come first.
It is handled the same throughout the country.
(R. 108).
It is clear that Mr. MaFarland is testifying that
he insists on confirmation of all orders; that t~e salesman must communicate the order to him, and that he
confirms it ''by either filling the order or rejecting it.''
In other words, he insists that his act of filling the
order, on the one hand, constitutes a confirmation of
which he alone has the jurisdiction. On the other hand,
if he fails to Bhip. he may thus reject the proferred
order. In neither case d·oes he necessarily communicate
any words to the intending :purchaser. I-Ie ships, or he
fails to ship.
Now the question is, and it '\\ras raised by the
court at page 109, what are the rights of the intending
purchaser during the interim~ ' 'Do you just keep him
dangling by the hook until you decide whether or not
you are going to fill his order~" To which Mr. McFarland answered:
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•~\\;ell, usually t'Yo or three days later or
'Yithin a reasonable time if the salesman finds
out the order isn't filled, he will go back and
try to apologize, as is being done most of the
tiine. '' (Due to shortage of product.)
This Ineans that McFarland treats the order as
aYailable to him to accept or reject after it has been
conununicated to him by the salesman; that the act of
acceptance or '' confirn1ation'' may consist of simply
shipping the merchandise, or that the act of refusal
may consist of a failure to ship the merchandise, in
'Yhich case, the salesman might or might not return
to the customer and state he was sorry but the order
was rejected. Is it an improper procedure~ Does this ·
handling of orders violate the law of contracts~ Had
the intending purchaser been unfairly dealt with~ The·
answer is no. 1 v\Tilliston on Contracts, Rev. Ed. 193.
It is cle.ar from pages 109 and 110 of the rec('~d
that the honorable trial judge made his decision, la·IJer
reflected in the findings, (R. 6), that the salesman in
such a situation, had the authority to make ;a present ·
sale; that the sale was and is consummated by the
salesman even before the offer is communicated to
the plant; that the plant has no right or power to
confirm, accept or reject, but that it is committed by
the salesman to supply the subject of the order as
agreed by the salesman; that otherwise the purchaser
\Yill be left dangling.''
This is the only way to ex:plain the findings and
deei ~ion of the trial court in this case. He found in
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effect that Basolo had absolute authority, and that all
of defendant's many salesmen acting similarly to
Basolo had authority to commit the plant without confirmation. This interpretation brings a flood of law
suits to the packing house business! (R. 109).
The evidence in the last portion of the record
shows that the court was impressed with what it felt
was an apparent injustice to the intending purchaser;
that the court did not intend to leave him "dangling
.on the hook." It is clear that the trial court did not
agree that McFarland should have the option when it·
received information about the offer from the intending purchaser to accept or reject, nor that the acceptance could be in the simple form of a shipment of
the goods, and a refusal to accept by a failure to ship.
What is the law of facts~
Does not the hat salesman from the New York
hat factory come to the Salt Lake haberdashery and
take an order for ten hats ·and communicate it to the
factory~ It takes 3 days for the order to be sent to
the factory, and a day to get to the man who must
coordinate production of the plant with distribution.
Does the plant man have an option to say to himself,
or to his organization alone, "yes, we will ship the
ten hats'', or ''no, we do not have the hats, .we will
ignore the order~'' Certainly the haberdasher must
wait a reasonable time. The cases hold that that sale~
man, in the absence of specific authority, does not
make a contract. The Salt Laker has made an offe:·.
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If the hats are shippPd within a reasonable time, the
act of shipn1ent constitutes an acceptance, and an executed unilateral contract results. If the manufacturer
does not ship ".,.ithin a reasonable time, (and no comnlunication of acceptance is required),_ the offer autorna tic ally dies. Is it of any consequence to the liability situation that the salesman returns and says:
'~ iliy company can't handle your business~''
The
ans,Yer 1s no.
Unilateral contracts come into existence not by
agreements, but by the act of an offeree in response
to the offer of the offeror. No words need he said
by the actor. Henderson v. Barber, 85 So. 35; 1 Willis
-ton on Contracts, Rev. Ed. 193. The words all come
from the person to whom the action is directed. Had
the company written ''We accept the order and will
ship'' a bilateral contract would result. Had Basolo
been told by nfcFarland that the offer W1as accepted
and Basolo had communicated it, there would have
been a binding bilateral contract. From ,all that appPars in the record, Moses did not inquire further
after the phone conversation with Basolo on October
28th, as to the acceptance of the plant, ( R. 45), so
that on this ,point no binding bilateral contract could
come into existence.
Clearly Basolo had no power to make a contract.
McFarland did not accept the offer as made, but
made a counter-offer, part at least of which was communicated to Moses for M·oses admitted he had re-
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ceived the house order Exhibit 9 which stated among
other things delivery "as available". ( R. 69). The
shipments were made by the plant on the basis of
the counteroffer. Every shipment made was less than
the 3000 pounds minimum in the rejected offer. (Exhibits 1 to 7). In behalf of the shipments the price
w1as higher. The shipments amounted to a series of
unilateral contracts.
It is clear the defendant never intended to bind
itself to minimum shipments. The only evidence thereof are the words of the agent testified to by Moses,
who vvas biased. Everything in the collateral f,act
situation compels the conclusion that the business was
intended at the time as an "as available" transaction.
As such, the offer must be looked at. as a divisible
offer requesting a series of acts, the shipment of the
first, not constituting an accept,a.nce of the whole.
W il'liston says it is possible to make such divisible
offer, as follows:
''If an offer is of this divisible character it
may be revoked not only before any acceptance,
but also as to any portion of the offer still
unaccepted even after acceptance of s-ome of
the series of transactions proposed by the offer.
1 ~williston on Contracts, Revised Ed. 163.
In the example of the hat salesman, if the offer
was for ten hats each month for 6 months, the salesman clearly not having authority to make such a contract, and the company started to fill the orders by
sending the first full o1·der, would it not follow, from
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the authority quoted fron1 Williston, that the offer
\Yas divisible and could be vvithdrawn, or rejected by
either party as to the future installments not yet
areepted ·?
•
,~V"illiston takes the other side of the problem for
analysis as to the power of the offeror to revoke
mid-\Yay in a series of acts, or one act taking some
time to perform. He states that the courts, in order
to avoid the hardship resulting from a revocation midway in performance, will interpret the contract as
being bilateral. But he seems to say that where the
situation is clearly unilateral involving a long extended
perfor1nance the offeree having begun performance,
that still the offeror may withdraw the offer since
the whole transaction is still optional with the offeref~.
1 Williston, Rev. Ed. 165.
The Restatement of contracts states that:
''A revocable offer contemplating a series
of independent contracts by separate acceptances
may be effectively revoked so as to terminate
the power to create future contracts, though
one or more of the proposed contracts have
already been formed by the offeree's acceptance."
1 Restatement of Contracts, 52.
In this case, the lack of product -forces the conclusion that a series of independent contracts for
separate acceptances was contemplated.
l~ ote the con1ments in the Restatement s-ection
above quoted:
a. An offer may propose several contracts to
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1a.rise at separate times. Such an offer is
divisible, and the power to make an effective revocation continues pari passu with
the continuing power to accept.
b. Where an offer contemplates a ~series of
unilateral contrf;tcts, beginning performance
of the consideration for any one of the
series makes the offer for that one irrevocable.
It is here submitted that the trial court was wrong
In inferring in the final pages of the transcript that
the plaintiff in this case should not be left dangling;
:and t·hat rather than achiev~ that result, it should
be found that there was a contract fro1n the time of
the telephone conversation. It is submitted that the
record shows that the court was influenced by what
the defendant did after it got the offer, than it was
by the actual or apparent authority of Basolo at the
time. The findings are not a true reflection of the facts.
What the defendant did after it received the offer
as communicated by Basolo is the important part of
this case, and obviously involves serious legal problems.
Clearly the offer as subrnitted was not accepted. A
counteroffer was given for communication to plaintiff.
Shipments began on the basis of the counteroffer. No
·Shipments needed to be made if the manager did not
wish to accept. This was obviously interpreted by the
trial court as keeping the plaintiff dangling. It is
submitted that such considerations should not havr
been the basis of the decision of the court as reflected
in the transcript and in the findings.
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The fact is that ship1nents beg'an under an "as
aYailable '' progra1n. Clear deviations from the intending purchaser's rejected offer, characterized the
ship1nents from the start. The plaintiff would now
say he 'vaived the defect in acceptance, and that there
has been "a contract made because he is willing to
disreg'ard the defect in the acceptance'' without colnmunication 'vith the offeree. 1\Ir. V\Tilliston says to
allo"'" such is to violate a vital law of contracts.
"Nothing is more fundamental than that in
bilateral contracts both parties must be bound,
or neither; and that in unilateral contracts the
performance requested must be simultaneous
with the creation of any obligation on the part
of the promisor. To allow ·a waiver of a defect
of an acceptance is virtually to say that the
acceptance is binding on the acceptor, or may
be treated as binding by the offeror (wh1ch
amounts to the same thing) from the time when
it is made though the offeror himself is still
perfectly free to assert that the acce:ptance was
defective, and though no estoppel forbids the
acceptor from showing the true facts. In truth,
a defective acceptance can only ~amount to d
counteroffer, and the only way a contract can
be formed is by acceptance of the counteroffer
in the same way as if it were an original offer.
1 Williston on Contracts, Revised Ed. 292.
Shipments made by defendant to plaintiff did not
constitute any acceptance of any contract. No contract
existed before shipment. Shipments made were on the
basis of a counteroffer made by defendant that it
,,·ould ship the scare produet "as available". The
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only binding con tract ere a ted by the transaction was
for plaintiff to pay for what he got, and this he did.
To allow plaintiff to recover for the balance of mutton
not shipped is wrong, unjust, and against the commerce and trade of a great established industry which
for years has done business under a differ~nt understanding of contract.
Note now what Moses says about choosing the time
for mitigating his damages:
''We had been given assurance right ·on down
the line that this mutton would be forthcoming.
We had a reserve of mutton on hand all the
time. We had assurance that as soon as the run
came or whatever condition came about that they
would fulfil their obligation, and ·only when it
was at that time indica ted to us that there was
no intention of fulfilling this thing were · we
forced to then buy mutton, because aboct that
time we were dangerously low in our supplies.''
(R. 72)
When was it that defendant "indicated to us that
there vvas no intention of fulfilling this thing"~ JYir
Farland had only one phone conversation vvith 1foses
-that on January 9th. (R. 90) He wrote only one letter,
January 15th. (Exhibit "D ") Other letters "rere written, but not until long after the alleged purchase April
28th in mitigation. The plaintiff testified that there was
a time indicated when the order would not be filled.
That time was at the latest January 9th, or 15th. That
was the time to mitigate the damages, not 4 months later.
The price of mutton on the ·Chicago market during the
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first \Yeek of January was 291;2 cents. The price when
plaintiff sa"? fit to mitigate \Yas 36 cents. We submit
this is quite a. spread, and plaintiff knew all the time
the price \Yas rising. (R. 33, 58) Bona fide~ No. It was
a studied attempt from the time of the January phone
call to torture a decent ordinary transaction into a hurtful one~ contrary to the understandings of the parties
and to the trade. Son1eone decided in January to take
advantage of the g·ood intention of Mr. McFarland, as
stated in his innocent letter of January 15th. Why did
Mr. McFarland send 332 pounds to plaintiff on J anu:a.ry
31 at 25 cents, if he kne"\v he "\vas stuck with a big contract for 24;·1· and why did Moses pay the bill for the
\

overage~

This was not mitigation. It was plotting. It was
taking advantage o£ a rising m'arket. Plaintiff had the
burden of proof that he did mitigate, that he used
reasonable effort. It would have been easy for plaintiff
to have bought lower than 34 cents, but he came into
·conrt having failed, yet asked and received from the
trial court, judgment based on a failure to follow good
conscience and the statute.

' re come now to an aspect of the record where

possibly the lack of good conscience is -a little more in
evidence. Mr. l\foses testified that when he did not
get the 3000 pounds expected in the second shipment
(Nov. 15, exhibit 3) he made .purchases in the open
market. (R. 51) He testified that he did what he could
to keep his supply coming. (R. 31) "We made wha.t
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purchases we could in the open market". (R. 51) "We
might have bought small amounts'' from others. (R. 63)
Then when he testified about the large purchase on April
28th, he testified: "This was a purchase - this was
the first purchase of a quantity, sizeable quantity, since
the time we had been dealing with McFarland' '. (R. 31,
63)

Mr. Moses reluctantly testified that he "might have"
bought quantities of the product from other shippers
in both December and January. (R. 63) Was it not his
duty to come into court and prove the ·amounts of these
purchases~ Was there not a studdied attempt to conceal them and thus take advantage of the rising market~
That w·as not quite the clean hands that might have been
shown. Yet the court below wholly disregarded these
. purchases. Ho\vever, the court itself was quite interested in asking about the reserves, regularly carried at
about 150,000 pounds. At the "first part of 1948",
Moses said they were down to as low ·as seventy thousand pounds. (R. 73) He also testified that they were
"dangero1isly low" at the time defendant refused to
ship. This would mean, in terms of the time defendant
actually refused, in January, that that was the time to
buy,- not four months later when the market had advanced from 29lf2c to 34c. To this defendant, the difference amounts to $1285.00, and to the conscience of the
sjtuation is important, to S'a~ the least.
It is submitted that plaintiff has failed to comply
with the law of mitigation, and that defendant has been
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injured thereby, as ·a result of the error of the trial court
in requiring plaintiff, as a condition of recovery, to disclose the true state of farts as to purchases m'ade. The
very least this court should do is to remand, and require plaintiff to bring into court from C·alifornia his
full rerords of purchases and disclose what boneless
mutton purchases were made between November 8, 1947
(Exhibit ~), "~hen the first shortage appeared, and
April 28, 1948, \Yhen the alleged mitigation purchase
was made. (Exhibit "H")

·Carlon v. Renting, 70 S.E. 923; 154 N.C. 530.
Denio Milling v. Malin, 165 P. 1113; 25 Wyo.
143.
Western Cooperate v. Colussi, 231 P. 1.
4. DEFENDANT AT NO TIME RATIFIED
THE ALLEGED CONTRACT MADE BETWEEN
PLAINTIFF AND THE SALESMAN BASOLO.
The findings of the court are to the effect that
a binding contract was entered into between the litigants at the time of a telephone conversation between
the salesman Baso'lo and plaintiff on or about October
28, 1947. (R. 6) T:hat was the testimony of the plain~
tiff. What the parties did after that telephone conversation is of no consequence according to the
findings.
Out of caution, defendant wishes to bring to the
attention of the court the relevant facts subsequent to
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the above conversation to prove that there could be
no ratification.
The Restatement of Agency, at page 197, defines
Ratification as follows:
''Ratification is the affirmance by a person of a ~prior act which did not bind him
but which was done or professedly done on his
account, w,hereby the act, .as to some or all
persons, is given effect as if originally authorized
by him.''
It is elsewhere shown herein that defendant
shipped certain quantities of boneless mutton, the
quantities being shown on exhibits 2 to 8 inclusive.
A schedule of such shipments appears on page 35
of this brief. Such shipments did not nor could they
constitute a ratification.
AJll of the shipments were made by defendant
under the belief that they were on an "·as available"
basis. Defendant did not have a copy of the plaintiff's alleged purchase order. (R. 95) It did have
the house order --which stated among ·other things t1ult
the shipn1ent was to be as· av2'-ilable. (Exhibit 9,
page 4) It did not know of the writing of exhibit "B"
until 7 months later. (R. 95). It did not know that
Basolo had not communicated its refusal to accept the
offer as orginially made. McFarland shipped on an
"open order." (R. 89, 101) Shipments were at "no
set priee. '' ( R. 101) The billings were 3 orders for
24~~ cents (Exhibits 2-r :3, 4), :2 orders for 24 3/4 centR
(Exhibits 5 and 6), and the fina11 order for 25 cent~
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(Exhibit 7). Plaintiff aeeepted
paid for then1.

the shipments

and

R.atifi~a tion

of the original offer, if accepted by .
Basolo, is not offirmed by the above acts. The above
aets are foreign to the offer as made. They constitute
ne'Y and additional ingredients. For ratification to
take place on the telephone ·order, there would have
to be shipments of 3000 pounds and billings at 24¥2
cents weekly. ..AJl of the above acts were done in
ignorance of any committment by the salesman, if any
was made by him, concerning the deliveries. The
authorities are unanimous in holding ''that there can
be no ratification by acquiescence, silence or f·ailure
to repudiate, un!less the principal has full and complete knowlege of all the material facts attending the
the unauthorized transaction." 2 Am. Jur. 190.
The Utah Supreme Court has said:
"It is also well recognized that in orrler
that a ratification of an unauthorized act or
transaction of an agent or of another may be
valid and binding, it is essential that the
principal or the person making the ratification
bad a fu1l knowledge at the time of the ratification of all material facts and circumstances
relative to the unauthorized act or transaction;
a1lso that an intention to ratify is essential and
whieh must be shown either by an express or
hy an implied ratification.''

Jones v. Mutual Creamery 17 P. 2d, 256, 259
In order to have an acceptance by shipping, the
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of the order must he complied with.
as to amount, terms, price, are fatal.

D~eviations

Miller Bros. Hat Co. v. A. D. Smith 201
NYS 47~6
Senner & Kaplan v. Gera Mills 173 NYS 265
Frick & Lindsay v. Johnson 115 At. 837
We now come to the events occuring in January
after all but the final shipment had been effected. It
appears that on or a few days before January 9,
1948, plaintiff telephoned defendant and discussed the
order. Let it he recalled that boneless mutton was
a seasonal item with defendant.
Moses testified that he phoned to appeal for the
product ordered, that he had ''made a deal for shipments of not less than 3000 pounds and that our
needs were 5000 pounds, and it was agreed that 5000
pounds would be the attempted amount shipped."
(R.~8)

Me Farland reported to plaintiff that ''there was
nothing available at the present time but he would do
~all he could to get going on this to the best of his
ability." (R. 28) Note plaintiff quotes the gener:1l
manager pretty close to the latters theory of the transaction throughout. Me Farland says by phone he will
get going to the "best of his ability". Then Moses
writes the letter of J~anuary 9, (Exhibit "C ",)
in which he outlines the terms of his offer to purehase :from the salesman, and asks defendant to stress
a point toward the minimum shipment, stating that
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his supplies are '' Yery acute''. Does this mean he
was about out'?
Plaintiff then wrote Exhibit "D", the letter of
January 15, and therein stated he wou!ld do his utmost to complete the transaction. Which transaction
may "~e ask! The transaction he had talked about
with his salesman wherein he had told the latter that
he would ship as available, but that no eommittment
could be made as to minimums! (R.88) Order No.
7001. Exhibit "A", was not before Me Farland when
he wrote the letter. Only a memory of his conversation with Basolo was in his mind. It cannt be doubted
that in answering the letter, McFarland had in mind
the ·open order basis, and that he had been doing the
best he could, and would continue to.
McFarland tald Moses at this time there was no
more mutton available, ''The sheep had all gone to
the winter desert. If we could find any additional
sheep we would bone them out and ship them as they
showed up on the market." (R. 91) It might be
6 weeks before another shipment, but it was impossible to make shipments. Moses told McFarland he
had a contra~t. McFarland answered he did n·ot,
that shipments were being made on an open order
as available as fast as we could accumulate it."
(R. 91)
Neither the pleadings, nor the findings alllege
or find that there was ratification, and none need
be argued. H·ovvever, it will no doubt he suggested
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by plaintiff. It is submitted that here, there is no
evidence of ratification. The verbal testimony of
· McFarland flatly repudiates acknowledgement of any
contract. It is apparent that he is still doing his
best to keep the business of this firm on the basis he
agreed upon. l-Ie cannot find the product, Hnd Moses
so testifi·ed that McFarland so stated on January
9th. That McFarland wrote the letter, E·xhibit "D",
still stating he would do his best is no ratification.
l-Ie stated: ''it is almost impossible to obtain any
mutton to bone". This is not the language of ratification. It is the language of a gentleman trying
to make good his promise that he would send all
available. This he faithfully did, sending no product
to any other customer. (R. 103)
N.ote that he made one additional shipment, Exhibit 7, after the phone call and letters, eonsisting
of 332 pounds at 25 cents. Gan this he evidence of
ratification~
Stil:l a deviation of quantity and price!
But plaintiff accepted it .
.-~he on}y other possible evidence of ratification
consists of letters written after the date plaintiff
claims he went into the market to "mitigate'' his
damage, and therefore, the letters are irrelevent.
The letter of June 7, Exhibit "G", explains Mr. McFarland's position long ofter the transaction, but the
disposition to do the best he can with a short supply
item is clear.ly in evidence. The lack of authority of
the salesrrl'an is in plaintiffs own exhibit.
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It is submitted that there 1s no evidenee if
ratification.

II
THE PLAINTIFF W AIVE.D HIS RIGHT TO
DAMAGES FOR THE D·EFICIENCIES IN THE
FIRST FIVE SHIPMENTS:
If the honorable court should dis.agree with our
contentions and find as did the lower eourt that a
binding contract was made between the p·arties, then
we submit the ·proposition that even if such were
true, the plaintiff, by his acts of aceeptance, without
notice to the defendant of any deficiencies or breach
or an,v complaint whatsoever until January 9, 1948,
waived his rights to the deficiencies in the shipments
and is estopped to now recover damages for them.
Utah Code .Section 81..;3-9 states .as follows" In
the absence of express or implied ag:reem,ent of the
parties acceptance of the goods by th,e buyer shall
not discharge the seller from liability in damages,
or other !legal remedy from breach of any promise
or warranty in the contract to sell or the sale. But
if after aceeptance of the goods the buyer fails to
give notice to the seller of the breach of any promise
or warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer
knows, or ought to know, of such breach, the seller
shall not be liable therefor."
This is identical to S·ect. 49 of the Uniform
Sales Act, also the Law of California.
A similar statement of the law is repeated in
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the the American Law Institute Restatement of Contracts' number 412: .
''Discharge of a Se~lers Duty After Buyers
Acceptance of Goods.''
''Under- a contract for the sale of goods,
the failure of the .buyer, .after acceptance of
goods tendered as performance of the contract, to give notice to the seller of the latter's
breach of any promise of warranty, within a
reasonable time after the buyer knows or has
reason to know of such breach, discharges the
seller's duty to make compensation." 2 Restatement of Contracts 777
The Courts uniformly hold under such statutory
provisions requiring notice of breach of warranty
that as a pre-requisite to a recovery for a breach
of warranty the purehaser must give notice to the
seller of such breach within a reasonable tin1e after
he knew, or under the circumstances, should haYe
•
known of the breach.
Truslo & Futle, v. Diarntond Bottling Co. 71
AI_jR 114~, with full annotation, 1149; 112 Conn.
181; 151 Atl 4:92.
V~illiston in his treatise on the law of .Sales Sec.
484-B states in regard to this section of the Sales Act
applied to deferred delivery. ''It might be urged that
the seller needs no notice in case of delivery delayed
beyond date expressly fixed in the contract, for he
must he a"'-Yare that he is viollating the provisions
of the contract, but though he knows this he does not
know whether the buyer is willing to accept deferred
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delivery as full satisfartion, and in any event the words
of the Statute seem plain."
3 '''illiston on Sales, Rev. Ed. 41
In the Dia ntond Bottli·n!J (~o. case, supra, the .
reas-on for such no tire is stated as follows:
''The purpose of the provision requiring such a notice is clearly to give the seller
timely information that the buyer proposes
to 'look to him f.or damages for the breach
that the former may govern his ·conduct accordingly.''
Here, plaintiff kne"\v he had dealt in a critical
item. available elsewhere to him, but -possibly not to
the defendant. ''Tith the rising ·price situation also
known to the plaintiff, it was elearly his duty to notify
defendant as the shipments came in short of his exThus his
pectations, and not delay for a month.
failure to timely complain, if there he found a
rontract, amounts to a waiver of a right to receive
the balanc-e of the weekly shipment.
III
PLAINTIFF DID NOT PROPERLY MITIGATE 1}..'-\l\f.L<\GES:
THE ,JUDGEMENT F'OR
l\IONEY IS EXCESSIVE.

If there was a contract and it was viorlated for
failure to deliver meat, plaintiff by law may enter
the market and purchase, charging defendant the
difference between the contract price and the market price in which he bought. However, for him to
do this, there are steps he must follow, and this
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we submit he has failed to do.
The law is generally stated 1n 46 Am. Jur. 830
as follows:
"The general rule that a party injured by
breach of contract is not entitled to recover
from the delinquent party damages which he
eould with reasonap!le effort or e~pense have
avoided is applicable in actions by the buyer
for the seller's breach with respect to delivery,
and under this rule the buyer may recover
only the damages he would have suffered if
he had ohtained elsewher-e goods like those the
seller has failed or refused to deliver.''
Warren v. Stoddard 105 U.S. 224.
This same :principle is found in the Uniform
Sales Act, a part of the Utah and the California law
as follows:
'' * * * where * * * the sell·er wr·ongfullly
refuses to deliver the goods, the buyer may
m·aintain an action against the s·eller f.or
. damages for nondelivery * * *
"Where there is an available market for
the goods in question, the measure of damages,
in the absence of special circumstances sho·wing proximate damages of a greater amount,
is the diff.erenee between the -contract price and
the market price ·or current price of the
goods at the time or times when they ought to
hav-e been delivered, or, if no time was fixed,
then at the time of the refusal to deliver.''
Utah Code Annutated, 1943, 81-5-5
Thus under the statute, plaintiff may possibly
recover. I-Iowever, he ha~: the burden of showing eolnpliance. He must purchase the goods in the market, if
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they are aYailable at the time of the failure to deliver,
or at the time of the refusal to deliver. This he did
not do, but did it months later during a time of rising
market. It is subn1itted he did not mitigate ihis damages. He accentuated them by what he did .
. .\ccording to the theory of the plaintiff there was
a failure to ship ordered mutton at the rate of a minimum of 3000 pounds per week beginning N overr.tber
~.

1947.

The fir~t shipment was deficient 149 pounds;
the second ~,916 pounds; the third 1800 pounds; t~he
fourth 2600 pounds; the fifth 2336. pounds; and the
sixth 2668 pounds._ Between the fifth and sixth shipment three weekly shipments were missed entirely.
Thus the defendant failed to deliver a- total of 21,459
pounds in these shipments and yet the plaintiff did not
attempt, so he pleaded and proved, to mitigate this
default until approximately three months after the
last shipment. During all this time, the plain tiff did
not contact the defendant about these deficiencies unti]
January 9, 1948.
Now checking with the statute, was there a. supply
of product available to plaintiff during the tim·es of
the deficiency~ Plaintiff himself testified that it was
"always available to him." (R. 41) He stated that he
might have purchased elsewhere in both December,
1947, and January, 1948. (R. 63) He stated that at
the time he contracted with defendant the product
was available at the same price elsewhere. (R. 46)
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On pages 67 Moses said that meat was not in short
supply and that "there was plenty of it available."
When the meat is available, there is a time limit
set in the statute when he must buy, to wit, "at the
time fixed for delivery, or at the time of the refusal
to deliver." If plaintiff had the contract he ·claimed
he had, there was a deficiency right from the first
shipment to the last. The time to make the purchase,
in true mitigation of the damage, was when the individual shipments came in short. With the market
rising, he stood by and allowed it to rise, instead of
entering the available market open to him and cutting
down the loss to plaintiff. Plaintiff should have purchased in mitigation beginning with November 8th
the difference between mutton received ~and the 3000
pounds expected.
It will be ·argued that defendant by his statements
on the January 9th phone conversation, and by the
letter, Exhibit '' D·", encouraged plaintiff to still hope
for the product, after the several breaches. It is
submitted that this is not an answer to the law requiring plaintiff to enter the market a_t the time of the
refusal to deliver. It is defendant's testimony undisputed, and corrobor~ated by the plaintiff, that no
mutton was available to the defendant. He told plaintiff plainly by phone that no product "ras available
(R. 28), that it "rould be ''weeks" before any would be
poRsible of shipment (R. 57). He wrote also in Exhibit
'' D '', ''it is almost ~mpossiblP to obtain ·any mutton
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to bone .. . there are no 8hePp coining to market''.
Moses testified that on J'anuary 9, he was aware
that defendant "~as '~tightly pressed" and that McFarland ''told me he had no more supply at that time.''
(R. 56) That \Yas the time for plaintiff to enter the
market.
i\fcFarland told plaintiff he would still do his
best, that there was a possibility that some herds
might be culled in the future, but this was clearly
speculative. (Exhibit "D ") This was the final time
the alleged contract vYas repudiated. Me Farland testified that in this :phone conversation he told Moses
there was no firm contract, but only an open orded.
(R. 91) T~his was also a time when defendant ''refused
to deliver", if it is not deemed that there wa.s a refusal
at the time of the alleged short shipments.

CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the lower court erred in entering its findings that there was a contract between the
parties for the reason that:
1. The s~alesman had no authority to make a contract, and that in fact he made no contract.
That defendant had the right to accept or reject any orders submitted, and that here it rejecteci
the offer, and gave a counteroffer to ship as available.
Full and faithful performanee was effected thereunder.
2.

3. The shipments m·ade by defendant did not conVPrt the former offer into an acceptance.
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4.

There was no ratification.

5. Even though the court finds there was a contract, the judgment is far in excess of what should be
because the plaintiff did not properly mitigate his
damages.
Defendant prays that the court reverse the judgment below. The least this court should do is remand
with instructions to require plaintiff to produce his
evidence of purchases so as to meet his burden of proving a true mitigation of damages.
Respectfully submitted,

WARWICK C. LAMOREAUX
DAVID K. WATKISS
At'torneys for Defendant.
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